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COMMENT 
STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS: WHICH SHALL GOVERN-
COMMENT K OR STRICT LIABILITY 
APPLICABLE TO ORDINARY PRODUCTS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1963, California adopted Justice Traynor's theory of 
strict liability for products. l One year later, the Restatement fol-
lowed his lead with the addition of section 402A which imposes 
liability upon manufacturers for selling defective products in 
conditions that are unreasonably dangerous.2 To establish strict 
liability, under section 402A, a plaintiff must prove that a prod-
uct was defective when it left a defendant's control and that the 
defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user.3 It is this 
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 697 (1963). Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor expressed the court's 
belief that manufacturers should be strictly liable in tort for articles which they place in 
the market, knowing the articles will not be further inspected, and possibly cause injury 
to human beings. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § ,402A (1964) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT § 402A). 
3. Id. In the Restatement § 402A, the defect requirement is expressed as follows: 
(1) One who sells any products in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused ... if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling 
such a product and (b) it is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. . 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a) 
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product and (b) the user or consumer has not 
bought the product from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller. 
309 
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defect' requirement that distinguishes strict products liability 
from other forms of strict liability.1I 
Because of the far-reaching consequences of strict products 
liability, the Restatement authors added comments a through q 
to qualify, explain, and sometimes restrict the application of sec-
tion 402A.6 Comment k is restrictive; it modifies the application 
of strict liability if unavoidably unsafe products are involved.7 
Using the vaccine for rabies as an example, the authors of the 
Restatement explained how some products are so beneficial to 
society that the risk of using the product is superseded by its 
need.s Specifically recognizing prescription drugs as such prod-
Id. 
4. Defective, according to comment g, is a condition, not contemplated by the ulti-
mate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. Id. at comment g. This is 
commonly referred to as the consumer-expectation test. California courts have estab-
lished that the defect can take one of three forms: a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, 
or an inadequate warning. 
5. See Comment, The Failure to Warn Defect: Strict Liability of the Prescription 
Drug Manufacturer in California, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 743, 749 n.37 (1983). 
6. See 38 American Law Institute (A.L.I.) Proc. 19, 90-98 (1961). During the discus-
sion of § 402A, A.L.I. member, Harold Gross, offered an amendment to exclude prescrip-
tion medicines as a class from the section's scope. He warned that including such prod-
ucts under strict liability would be "against the public interest" due to the "very serious 
tendency to stifle medical research and testing that would result." Id. at 91. Dean Pros-
ser, the Reporter for the Restatement, replied that he was very concerned about this 
problem and that he had struggled unsuccessfully to solve it in drafting the text. He 
recommended that rather than including it in the text, these special problems posed by 
such medicines should be dealt with in the comments accompanying § 402A. The A.L.I. 
agreed. Id. at 94. 
7. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. Comment k provides that a 
product will not be considered unreasonably dangerous if it is properly prepared, accom-
panied by proper directions and warnings; also, a seller will not be held to strict liability 
as a result of injury in those circumstances. Id. However, if the product is not prepared 
properly, a manufacturer will be held to strict liability. Id. The same is true with warn-
ings and directions; they must be appropriate under the circumstances. Id. The law calls 
it strict liability but the reasonableness aspect requires a negligence analysis. Id. 
8. Id. Comment k states: 
There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their 
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in 
the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for 
the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads 
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. 
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, 
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justi-
fied, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree of risk 
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defec-
2
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ucts, the authors of the Restatement recognized that a product's 
makers should not be subjected to strict liability if a product is 
properly manufactured and accompanied by proper directions 
and appropriate warnings.s Unless there is something wrong 
with such a product, apart from its unavoidable hazards, it will 
not be defective according to the standards of section 402A.lO 
The California appellate courts have traditionally treated 
prescription drugs as the primary group governed by comment 
k." Although the California Supreme Court has not directly 
dealt with this issue, the court has recently acknowledged that it 
is looking for a case in which to consider the application'of ordi-
ld. 
tive, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of 
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for 
this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician .... The seller of such 
products, again with the qualification that they are properly 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where 
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because 
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently 
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but ap-
parently reasonable risk. (Emphasis added.) 
9. ld. Manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products may incur strict liability only 
if there is a manufacturing flaw or an inadequate warning. Comment k, therefore, em-
ploys a combination of strict liability principles and negligence principles. The unavoid-
ably unsafe product can not be deemed defective solely because it fails to perform as 
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect it to when used in an intended or reasona-
bly foreseeable manner. ld. 
10. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser pointed out that 
there must be something wrong with a product to make it unreasonably dangerous to 
those who come in contact with it. He noted that an ordinary pair of shoes was not 
unreasonably dangerous just because the soles became slippery when wet; nor was a 
hammer unreasonably dangerous because one might smash a thumb. Likewise, knives 
and axes must be able to cut in order to be useful. [d. at 659. 
11. In several decisions, California's courts of appeal have discussed comment k in a 
manner that indicates the court believes comment k should apply to all prescription 
drugs. See McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86-87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730,736 
(1978) (comment k "implicitly recognizes the social policy behind the development of 
new pharmaceutical preparations"); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 987-91, 95 
Cal. Rptr. 381, 398-402 (1971) (quoting and applying comment k); Toole v. Richardson-
Merrill, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 708-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412-14 (1967) (quoting and 
applying comment k); Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 
79-80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971) (citing comment k with approval); Grinnell v. 
Charles Pfizer & Company, 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 435 n.7, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 n.7 
(1969) (citing comment k in dictum and stating that when "products, such as drugs, 
which are unavoidably unsafe ... [are) properly prepared and accompanied by proper 
directions and warning, [they are) neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous"). 
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nary strict products liability principles to prescription drugs, 
rather than section 402A and its comments.12 Furthermore, 
Chief Justice Rose Bird has stated that she believes the stan-
dard generally applied in strict liability cases should also be ap-
plied to drug manufacturers. l3 
This change would be troublesome. For over two decades 
the California appellate courts have consistently allowed com-
ment k to govern prescription drugs. If the court should decide 
to apply the strict liability standard for ordinary products in-
stead of the strict liability standard for unavoidably unsafe 
products, it will refute its own reasoning that precedent should 
determine the standard for defectiveness in the products liabil-
ity field;a the purpose of comment k would be defeated. lIi 
This Comment will review the history of strict products lia-
bility and the policies which have shaped its development. It will 
examine the state of the law today regarding strict liability for 
harm caused by prescription drugs, and demonstrate that com-
ment k should continue to govern prescription drugs. Further-
more, it will point out that sound reasoning and public policy 
dictate that the modified strict products liability of comment k, 
rather than ordinary strict products liability, is the appropriate 
theory to establish liability for prescription drugs; it is also the 
method most beneficial to society's needs. Finally, this Comment 
12. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 694, 677 P.2d 1147, 1148, 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 870, 871 (1984). In the opinion, Justice Richardson stated: 
[d. 
Although we granted hearing in this case to consider the ap-
plication of strict liability principles to injurious side effects 
allegedly produced by prescription drugs, our review of the 
record has convinced us that in light of the basis upon which 
plaintiff tried his case, this broader issue is not properly 
before us. 
13. [d. at 720, 677 P.2d at 1166, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 889 (Bird, J., dissenting). 
14. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978). In Barker, the court emphasized that "the defectiveness con-
cept defies a simple, uniform definition applicable to all sectors of the diverse product 
liability domain." [d. The Barker court further explained that the question of what de-
fect concept was appropriate could "best be resolved by resort to the 'cluster of useful 
precedents' which have been developed in the product liability field in the past decade 
and a half." [d. at 428,573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. 
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134 n.16, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 
n.16 (1972)). 
15. See supra note 7. To apply the same test to determine liability for prescription 
drugs and ordinary products would defeat the purpose of comment k. 
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will predict how the California Supreme Court will apply com-
ment k to prescription drugs when the court is faced with the 
appropriate case. 
II. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
A. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
1. Development of a Cause of Action 
Strict liability was first advocated as a basis of recovery for 
injuries related to defective products by former Justice Traynor 
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling CO.16 In Escola, the plaintiff, a 
waitress, was injured when a soda bottle broke in her hand as 
she carefully moved it from the case to the refrigerator.17 The 
defendant bottler used pressure to bottle carbonated beverages 
and had exclusive control over both the charging and the inspec-
tion of the bottle.ls Although it was not clear whether the explo-
sion had been caused by an excessive charge or a defect in the 
glass, the court felt that neither problem would have ordinarily 
been present if the bottler had used due care.19 A majority of the 
court held that negligence could be inferred based upon the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur.20 
Justice Traynor, in a concurring opmIOn, asserted that a 
manufacturer's negligence should not provide the only basis for 
a plaintiff's right to recover.21 According to Justice Traynor, a 
manufacturer should be liable for any injury caused by a defect 
in a product which the manufacturer placed on the market 
knowing it would be used without further inspection.22 This type 
of liability would discourage manufacturers from marketing de-
16. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
17. [d. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437. 
18. [d. at 459, 150 P.2d at 439. 
19. [d. at 461, 150 P.2d at 441. 
20. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrong-
doer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided: (1) the 
character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief 
that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which 
caused the injury is shown to have been under the exclusive management of the alleged 
wrongdoer. The rule may not apply when direct evidence of negligence exists. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
21. Escola at 461, 150 P.2d at 440. 
22. [d. 
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fective products that cause injury.23 
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,24 the California 
Supreme Court adopted Justice Traynor's position and held that 
the cost of injuries from defective products should be borne by 
the manufacturers of such products.2Ci In Greenman, the plain-
tiff's wife bought, from a retailer, a power tool made by the de-
fendant. 26 While using the tool as a lathe, the plaintiff was in-
jured when a piece of wood he was shaping flew up and hit him 
in the face. 27 At trial, experts testified that the lathe was defec-
tive in design; the set screws were inadequate to hold certain 
adjustments. The harm could have been prevented by a different 
design.26 Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, reaf-
firmed his concurrence in Escola. 29 Manufacturers should be 
strictly liable for defective products which cause injury when 
such manufacturers place these articles on the market knowing 
they will be used without further inspection.30 
One year after Greenman, section 402A was added to the 
Restatement. Section 402A defines defective products as those 
products that cause injury due to a condition not contemplated 
by the ultimate consumer.31 The Restatement provides that a 
product will not be unreasonably dangerous if it is accompanied 
by appropriate directions or warning ;32 the duty to warn is de-
termined by the seller's knowledge.33 Although the language of 
the Restatement seemed clear, the authors34 went a step further 
23. [d. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. 
24. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
25. [d. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
26. [d. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699. 
29. [d. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
30. [d. 
31. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment g. 
32. According to the Restatement, in order to prevent a product from being unrea-
sonably dangerous, it may be necessary for a seller to give directions or provide warnings 
on a product's container. [d. at comment j. 
33. [d. A seller is required to give a warning if he has knowledge, or by the applica-
tion of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight, should have knowledge of the 
risk. [d. 
34. Roger J. Traynor, then Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and the 
principal architect of California's product liability system, was one of the official advisors 
to the Restatement and was extremely concerned about this particular application of 
strict liability. 
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to ensure against the likelihood of liability for unavoidable inju-
ries from drugs which are beneficial to society.311 This emphasis 
demonstrated the authors' intent. 
In less than a decade later, Cronin u. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,36 
rejected the Restatement's definition of defective for ordinary 
products; the defect no longer had to be unreasonably danger-
ous. Instead, the court decided that a plaintiff need only prove 
there was a defect in the product, and that the defect was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.37 In Cronin, the driver 
of a nine year old bakery truck was forced off the road as he 
tried to pass another vehicle.88 The impact broke the safety hasp 
that held bread trays, thereby freeing the trays.89 The trays then 
fell forward, struck the plaintiff in the head, and knocked him 
through the front windshield.·o The plaintiff alleged that the 
hasp was defective. n The defendant appealed from a judgment 
for the plaintiff on the ground that the trial judge omitted the 
requirement that a defect must be "unreasonably dangerous. ".2 
According to the court, the unreasonably dangerous qualifi-
cation was not in the original formulation of strict liability set 
forth in Greenman, but had its origin in the Restatement.·8 The 
Cronin court cited a number of cases to explain or support the 
general products liability rules articulated." Significantly, none 
of those cases involved a prescription drug or any other unavoid-
ably unsafe product.u Precedent, in the field of products liabil-
ity law, was treating ordinary products and unavoidably unsafe 
products differently. The Restatement's definition of defect for 
unavoidably unsafe products was not rejected. 
35. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. Comment k provides that 
unless an unavoidably unsafe product, such as a prescription drug, is improperly pre-
pared or not accompanied by appropriate directions or warnings, it is not defective; 
therefore, the product's manufacturer will not be held strictly liable. [d. 
36. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). 
37. [d. at 132-34, 501 P.2d at 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-43. 




42. [d. at 128-29, 501 P.2d at 1158-59, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 130-33, 501 P.2d at 1160-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440-43. 
45. [d. 
7
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2. Defect Defined 
Although Cronin had established that, in order for a prod-
uct to be defective, it need not be unreasonably dangerous, it 
was unclear what constituted a defect!6 However, that issue was 
clarified in Barker v. Lull Engineering Company, Inc:" The 
Barker court established that there are at least two kinds of de-
fects: manufacturing defects and design defects!8 Manufactur-
ing defects exist in products that are not as a manufacturer in-
tended them to be, or which differ from other supposedly 
identical products of the same product line!9 Design defects are 
determined according to Barker's two-prong test.60 First, a prod-
uct may be found defective in design if a plaintiff can show that 
a product does not function as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect it to function while using it for its intended or rea-
sonably intended purpose.61 Second, as an alternate test, a prod-
uct may be found defective in design if a plaintiff can show that 
a product's design was the proximate cause of his or her inju-
ries.62 Once a plaintiff proves that a product was the proximate 
cause of his or her injuries, a defendant must establish that the 
benefits of the design outweigh the inherent risks.63 If, through 
hindsight, a court determines that the risk of danger inherent in 
a challenged design outweighs the benefits of the design, the 
product is defective.64 
Barker examined the issues of products liability as they ap-
plied to a forklift. The plaintiff was injured when a high-lift 
loader he was operating overturned.66 To support the court's ap-
plication of the two-prong test in determining design defect, the 
Barker court cited approximately thirty cases; none of the cases 
involved an unavoidably unsafe product.66 Barker established a 
46. Cranill, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433. 
47. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
48. [d. at 426-30, 573 P.2d at 452-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234-38. 
49. [d. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. 





55. [d. at 413, 573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 225. 
56. [d. Significantly. the caurt noted that the term defect was misleading because it 
was not defined. [d. at 428, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235. According to the 
8
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definition for defects in design and manufacturing only. Un-
avoidably unsafe products were presumably covered by com-
ment k.&7 
The third form of defect, inadequate warning, was not dis-
cussed in Cronin or Barker. In Barker, the court did not decide 
the warning issue because the issue was not properly before the 
court.&8 However, both before and after Barker, the standard for 
determining the adequacy or need for warning has been com-
ment j to the Restatement; the duty to warn arises if a manufac-
turer knows or should have known of a dangerous condition. &9 
The California Supreme Court has not addressed the warn-
ing issue, but the California appellate courts have continued to 
apply the Restatement in failure to warn cases.80 Christofferson 
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,81 a leading drug injury case, was 
decided under section 402A.82 In Christofferson, the plaintiff 
suffered permanent visual impairment as a result of ingesting a 
prescription drug to treat a skin condition.8s The court decided 
that, because the harmful side effect was not known at the time 
of the injury, the manufacturer was not strictly liable.8• The Re-
statement and its comments were again affirmed as a basis for 
determining warning defect in Carmichael v. Reitz.8'" The appel-
late court approved the trial court's jury instructions pertaining 
to the strict liability of a drug manufacturer for failure to warn 
of a risk inherent in a drug; the instructions were based on the 
court, it was easier to apply a definition of defect to manufacturing defects. Id. The court 
further noted that products likely to be injurious in their normal condition, would need a 
more specific definition of defect. Id. at 427, 573 P.2d 453·54, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36. 
57. Id. at 413, 573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 225. 
58. Id. at 420 n.l, 573 P.2d at 449 n.l, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229 n.!. 
59. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment j. The Restatement standard of 
strict liability for failure to warn was explained in Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 433. Comment j was first used as the test of defectiveness for failure to 
warn in Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965). In 
Cavers v. Cushman, 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979), a case following 
Barker, the court noted that Cronin did not alter the standard for defectiveness due to 
an inadequate warning. Id. at 343, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
60. See Comment, supra note 5, at 746-47. 




65. 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971). 
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Restatement and its comments.66 
The California Supreme Court recently had an opportunity 
to determine the duty of a pharmaceutical manufacturer to warn 
of potential side effects of prescription drugs.67 In Finn v. G.D. 
Searle & Company, the court instructed the jury that a manu-
facturer of a prescription drug was liable to a plaintiff if the 
manufacturer failed to warn the medical profession within a rea-
sonable time after he or she knew of potentially harmful side 
effects.68 The court further instructed the jury that a manufac-
turer was under a duty of due care to warn the medical profes-
sion of potential dangers even if the percentage of users who 
might be harmed was minor.69 The duty, however, did not ex-
tend beyond warning the medical profession; the drug manufac-
turer had no duty to warn the patient.70 To be adequate, a warn-
ing must be reasonable under the circumstances.71 The standard 
of strict liability for failure to warn used in defective product 
cases, and in defective drug cases, remained the standard set 
forth in the Restatement and its comments. 
III. PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS AND STRICT LIABILITY 
Under present California law, the unavoidably unsafe prod-
uct doctrine of section 402A of the Restatement governs all 
pharmaceutical medicines.72 Recently, however, in Finn v. G.D. 
Searle & Company, the California Supreme Court expressed an 
interest in reviewing strict products liability as applied to pre-
scription drugs.73 The court noted that failure-to-warn cases in 
66. Id. at 987, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 398. In Carmichael, the plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of the drug Enovid which was prescribed to the plaintiff by her physician to help 
her become pregnant. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that an inadequate warning by the 
drug manufacturer caused her to suffer blood clots in her lung and her leg. Id. 
67. 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984). 




72. See supra note 11. 
73. 35 Cal. 3d at 694, 677 P.2d at 1149, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (1984). In Finn, the 
trial court rejected the plaintiff's proposed instruction for a manufacturer's duty to warn. 
The modified instruction provided, in part, that a drug manufacturer is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to warn of potential dangers reasonably foreseeable from the use 
of the manufacturer's drug. The plaintiff argued that, by modifying the proposed in-
struction, the trial court introduced negligence principles which impaired the plaintiff's 
10
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California have been subject to a distinct form of analysis re-
garding strict liability.7. Some California courts have held that 
concepts of negligence are absorbed by the doctrine of strict lia-
bility; other courts have decided that although the rules ex-
pressed in comment j are referred to as strict liability rules, they 
are merely well settled rules of negligence.711 
A California trial court recently ruled on the applicable 
strict liability law in DES litigation.76 The court stated that be-
cause Finn had not provided suitable precedent to decide the 
issues, it would look to other authority for their resolution. The 
court relied upon those cases that deal with the application of 
strict liability to prescription drugs and which have accepted the 
Restatement's section 402A and comments j and k.77 The court 
further determined that the design defect standards of Barker 
are not applicable to prescription drugs.78 
strict liability claim. The California Supreme Court noted, however, that these assertions 
were founded upon the proposition that there is a significant difference between negli-
gence claims and strict liability claims due to failure to warn. The court pointed out that 
if one determined liability for failure to warn of defects discovered after a product 
caused injury (i.e., a Barker hindsight analysis) there would be a substantial distinction 
between a negligence standard and strict liability. Id. 
74. Id. at 699, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874. 
75. Id. at 700, 677 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The court noted that both 
common sense and experience dictate that it would be impractical to impose a need to 
warn based on every piece of information in a manufacturer's possession. According to 
the court, to overwarn is to reduce the effectiveness of all warnings. Id. 
76. DES is the abbreviation for Diethylstilbestrol, an estrogen preparation that was 
prescribed to prevent miscarriages. See infra note 77. In re DES Litigation, No. 830-109 
(Cai. Super. Ct., San Francisco, Aug. 16, 1985) (General Order No. 11) (petition for writ 
pending hearing of April 21, 1986) [hereinafter cited as In re DES Litigation). With the 
concurrence of all parties to the DES litigation, common issues were submitted to the 
Complex DES Litigation Judge, after briefing and argument, for decisions that would 
have common application to the DES cases before the court. Id. 
77. In re DES Litigation, at 5. After analysis of those cases and the Restatement, 
the court concluded: 
Id. 
there is substantial legal authority in [California) adopting 
comments j and k standards in strict liability litigation involv-
ing ethical drugs and their potentially injurious side effect. Di-
ethylstilbestrol, prescribed for the purpose of treatment of 
threatened and habitual miscarriage, is a prescription drug 
and falls within the ambit of comments j and k. 
78. Id. Initially, the court maintained that the product would fail to meet the 
threshold requirement of the first prong of Barker or the "consumer-expectation" test 
because it was not a product within the common experience of ordinary consumers. Id. 
at 11-12. The court pointed out that such a product was made according to a scientific 
formula and prescribed according to a physician's judgment. Id. Likewise, the court ex-
11
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The California Appellate Court recently affirmed its posi-
tion on strict liability and unavoidably unsafe products in Kearl 
u. Lederle Laboratories.79 The Kearl court ruled that although 
unavoidably unsafe products, like all other products, are subject 
to strict liability for manufacturing defects, they are not subject 
to strict liability for design or warning defects.so The court noted 
that even though defective warning in products liability cases 
may be a basis for strict liability, the appropriate analysis is 
based on negligence. S1 
In Kearl, a child developed paralysis about four weeks after 
receiving an oral polio vaccine.S2 The child's parents alleged that 
the drug was defective due to design and warning and asserted a 
strict products liability theory at trial,83 The trial court allowed 
strict products liability design defect testimony, and instructed 
the jury on the Barker theory of design defect.s• Although the 
child's mother had read and signed a warning noting the risk of 
contracting polio from the vaccine, she alleged that the warning 
was inadequate; she contended that the warning failed to inform 
her that oral polio vaccine was "the best way to get polio 
today."slI 
On appeal by the drug manufacturer, the court found that 
the trial court erred in allowing the child's parents to present a 
strict products liability design defect case. According to the 
court, the lower court should have first determined whether or 
not the product was unavoidably unsafe, and therefore, exempt 
plained that the second Barker test, the risk-benefit analysis, was equally inappropriate 
because the object of that test is to determine if the risk of danger inherent in the design 
outweighs the benefit of that design. [d. at 12. Such a test was premised primarily on the 
likelihood of a different design posing less risk. The court pointed out that in most pre-
scription drugs there is no alternate design available. [d. The court further argued that 
to adopt either of the tests set forth in Barker would require abandoning the policy 
considerations of comments j and k which have become a part of the strict liability law 
of California and that the court had neither the inclination nor authority to do so. [d. at 
12-13. The court concluded, therefore, that since there was no allegation of a manufac-
turing or production defect in the DES cases, strict liability will apply only when a de-
fect is based on a failure to warn. [d. at 13. 
79. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985). 
80. [d. at 817, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 454. 
81. [d. at 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 465. 
82. [d. at 820, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 456. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. at 834, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 467. 
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from strict product design liability.ss The court noted that for 
over two decades courts have decided that some special products 
should not be subjected to a strict liability design defect analy-
sis; those products are often prescription drugs.s7 Furthermore, 
the court contended that a Barker standard for determining de-
sign defect may result in a delay of marketing products because 
of further testing.ss The court pointed out that these considera-
tions suggested that special unavoidably unsafe products tip the 
scales away from holding a manufacturer strictly liable so as to 
ensure a product's availability.ss 
The Kearl court required a determination as to whether a 
product, including a drug, is to be viewed as unavoidably un-
safe. so These special products should not be judged in light of 
ordinary consumer expectations or present scientific knowledge; 
they should be reviewed according to a manufacturer's actual or 
constructive knowledge at the time of marketing.s1 Consistently, 
for over two decades, the courts have concluded that these prod-
ucts, including prescription drugs, should be exempt from the 
normal strict products liability design defect analysis.sz 
IV. A BARKER ANALYSIS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
A. PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS ARE UNIQUE 
Barker determined that a product is defective in design if it 
fails one of two alternate tests.SS First, if the product does not 
function as an ordinary consumer would expect when the con-
86. [d. at 836, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 468. The court also ruled that the warning was, as a 
matter of law, adequate under the circumstances. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. at 823-24, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59. The court conceded that whereas this 
delay may be beneficial to society as far as general products were concerned, in the case 
of some special products, such as prescription drugs, a delay in marketing may prolong 
suffering or deny a needed cure. [d. at 823, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Furthermore, the court 
stated, increased production costs, which will stem from increased insurance costs as well 
as from extended testing, can conceivably cause manufacturers to withdraw or decline to 
develop certain products. [d. at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459. 
89. [d. at 824-25, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460. 
90. [d. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64. 
91. [d. at 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460. 
92. [d. See also supra note 11. 
93. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 462, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 225, 244 (1978). 
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sumer uses the product in a reasonably foreseeable manner, or 
second, if a plaintiff can show, from a hindsight perspective, that 
the product's design was the proximate cause of injury and that 
the risks inherent in the design outweigh its benefits.94 
A prescription drug is not designed. Drugs are produced ac-
cording to a formula, the component parts of which combine to 
create the desired results.911 The inclusion of each component is 
necessary to produce the formula.96 To change the formula is to 
produce a different drug. Therefore, liability based on the pre-
mise that an alternate design would have avoided the harm 
caused by the drug used is not applicable to prescription drugs. 
As set forth in the Restatement, drugs were never intended to be 
found defective in design under a strict liability standard, only 
under a negligence standard.97 
Under strict liability, a manufacturer can be held liable sim-
ply for manufacturing a product; this is because liability is based 
on unforeseeable risks as well as foreseeable risks. Because drugs 
are chemical compounds, they contain components that may ad-
versely affect certain individuals.96 As Dean Prosser observed: 
The argument that industries producing poten-
tially dangerous products should make good the 
harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add 
the cost to the price of the product, encounters 
reason for pause, when we consider that two of 
the greatest medical boons to the human race, 
penicillin and cortisone, both have their danger-
ous side effects, and that drug companies might 
well have been deterred from producing and sell-
ing them.BB 
Comment k cites prescription drugs and vaccines as exam-
ples of products that are unavoidably unsafe, and therefore, are 
not unreasonably dangerous as long as they are properly manu-
94. [d. 
95. Amicus Brief (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) for Appellant, Kearl 
v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985). 
96. [d. at 41-42. 
97. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. 
98. See Amicus Brief, supra note 95. 
99. See PROSSER, supra note 10. 
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factured and a proper warning given. loo To apply the consumer-
expectation text to an unavoidably unsafe product, such as a 
prescription drug, is illogical. A prescription drug is a chemical 
compound; the very chemical formula that produces a desired 
result is the same formula that causes the unwanted side effect. 
Liability for a manufacturer's inability to alter unique chemical 
compounds should not be premised upon a consumer's expecta-
tion that an unwanted but unpreventable side effect will not 
occur. 
The consumer-expectation test requires that a product per-
form as an ordinary consumer would expect under reasonable 
circumstances. 10l Prescription drugs are only available to an or-
dinary consumer by prescription written by a physician; a physi-
cian should determine a consumer's expectations. A physician 
decides when a medicine and when and if certain warnings 
should be given. Once a manufacturer has warned a physician of 
any known risks, a manufacturer's control over consumer-expec-
tation has ended. To hold a manufacturer liable for a consumer's 
independently conceived expectations would be unreasonable. 
An example, used by the authors of comment k, as to why it 
would be illogical and unjust to hold manufacturers liable for 
unavoidable harmful side effects is demonstrated by the rabies 
vaccine. l02 As was observed in comment k, a person who has 
been exposed to rabies has two choices: he can decline to take 
the vaccine treatment, thereby risking the occurrence of a dis-
ease which invariably leads to a dreadful death, or he can take 
the treatment which may cause serious consequences. loa A pa-
tient and his physician are in the best position to make that de-
cision. If the courts held a drug manufacturer liable for all resul-
tant injuries, they would interfere with the treatment for rabies. 
The second prong of Barker states that products are defec-
tive if the benefits from their design do not outweigh the risks. lo• 
Comment k, likewise, requires a balancing; a plaintiff has the 
100. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. 
101. Id. at comment g. 
102. Id. at comment k. 
103. Id. 
104. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 225 (1978). 
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option to show that an unreasonable risk was present when he 
used a product. 1011 A significant difference between the risk-bene-
fit analysis of comment k and Barker is that Barker determined 
the risk according to hindsight. l06 If at the time of trial it is 
known that the risks of using a product outweigh the benefits, 
the product is determined defective. Comment k, however, ex-
pressly rules out hindsight liability even as to new or experimen-
tal drugs for which unforeseen side effects are always a possibil-
ity. It merely provides that knowledge, by a manufacturer, at 
production time should justify the marketing and use of a 
drug. l07 A hindsight analysis of risk would deter research and 
production of experimental drugs. l08 
The comment k requirement also differs from Barker proce-
durally. Once a plaintiff establishes that a product's design prox-
imately caused his injury, Barker places upon a manufacturer of 
ordinary products the burden of establishing that the benefits of 
a product's design outweigh its risks.loe Barker's threshold re-
quirement that a plaintiff prove that a design, as opposed to a 
product, proximately caused his injury/lo contemplates that the 
product could have been designed in some other fashion. When 
a product is unavoidably unsafe, by definition, it cannot be 
designed differently. 
Additionally, the Barker court shifted the burden of proof 
to a manufacturer because evidence relevant to determining 
risks and benefits, such as the cost of an alternate design, in-
volve technical matters often within the knowledge of a manu-
facturer.111 However, the question of an alternate design is not 
at issue in an unavoidably unsafe product. Therefore, the only 
question remaining, determining risks and benefits, involves em-
pirical evidence compiled not only by manufacturers but by the 
Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control, 
and other entities that conduct such studies.112 This information 
105. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. 
106. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225. 
107. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. 
108. See supra note 88. 
109. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225. 
110. [d. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235. 
111. [d. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. 
112. See Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 41-42. 
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is readily available to product liability plaintiffs.1l3 The risk-
benefit analysis that precedes approval of any prescription drug 
is sufficient; it does not warrant the imposition of an additional 
burden of proof upon manufacturers.1l4 
B. PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG SHORTAGES DUE TO FEAR 
OF LIABILITY 
Application of a Barker analysis to prescription drugs will 
have a negative effect upon the supply of necessary pharmaceu-
tical drugs. m If drug companies are held liable for unforeseeable 
or unavoidable injuries, the fear of such liability can extend test-
ing of new drugs and delay marketing. Further, manufacturers 
of unavoidably unsafe drugs may cancel drug production be-
cause of the fear of liability. 
Illustrative of the negative effect strict liability will have 
upon drug manufacturers is the case of the swine flu vaccine 
shortage. lI6 In 1976, President Gerald Ford announced plans to 
conduct a national vaccination program against a newly discov-
ered influenza virus, the swine flu.1l7 A swine flu vaccine was 
ready for production, but fear of liability by drug manufacturers 
caused insurance companies to deny liability coverage to manu-
facturers of the vaccine.1l8 Consequently, manufacturers were 
unwilling to supply the vaccine. lIB Production of the vaccine 
proceeded only after Congress passed legislation naming the 
United States as the defendant in any action by recipients of the 
vaccine. 120 
Recently, a major drug company stopped production of 
diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine because of the 
"extreme liability exposure, cost of litigation and the difficulty 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See supra note 88. 
116. See Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons 
from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 754 (1977). 
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of continuing to obtain adequate insurance."121 Subsequently, 
another major drug company acted similarly.122 The company 
informed the federal government's Centers for Disease Control 
that, due to the unwillingness of its liability carriers to renew 
coverage of DPT vaccine sales, the company would be unable to 
respond to new requests to supply the vaccine to state and local 
health departments.123 One vaccine manufacturer remained in 
the market and announced it would attempt to make up the re-
sulting shortage of vaccine. l24 However, this manufacturer ex-
perienced production problems which prompted the Director of 
the Centers for Disease Control to advise Congress that, unless 
drastic measures were taken, there would be shortages of DPT 
in the early months of 1985 in many areas of the country.12I! 
At a house committee hearing, a physician, speaking on be-
half of the American Academy of Pediatrics, suggested that in-
stead of spreading the cost of a very limited risk, expanded lia-
bility would greatly increase the risk to the public.u6 After 
noting that high liability awards had driven several vaccine pro-
ducers out of the market and that remaining producers had sig-
nificantly increased prices, the physician expressed concern that 
either an insufficient supply or cost of the DPT vaccine would 
make the vaccine unobtainable to a large segment of the popula-
tion.127 He placed the blame on "the deteriorating liability situa-
tion" and noted that the tort process has not served us well.128 
Additionally, he asserted that many vaccines are still needed 
even though the diseases are rare; if parents stopped immuniz-
ing their children, the diseases would reappear.129 
For example, oral polio vaccine has been deemed an effec-
tive method for preventing polio in the vast majority of those 
who use it.130 Without the vaccine, there would be many victims 
121. Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
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of this disease. However, the very nature of the live vaccine 
means that on rare occasions, and without any way of predicting, 
some unfortunate recipients contract the disease from the 
vaccine. 131 
C. ApPLICATION OF COMMENT K 
Comment k does not grant pharmaceutical manufacturers 
immunity from strict product liability rules.132 On the contrary, 
these manufacturers may be held strictly liable for any medicine 
that they improperly prepare; improper preparation is consid-
ered a manufacturing defect.1s3 Furthermore, drug manufactur-
ers may be liable for inadequate warnings. Comment k mandates 
that the medicine in question must present only a "reasonable 
risk" to the public; the benefits from its use must outweigh the 
attendant risks.13• However, manufacturers under comment k 
are required to provide warnings against even unavoidable risks 
although the user can do nothing to reduce those risks.13G Addi-
tionally, a pharmaceutical manufacturer must provide warnings 
against preventable dangers.13s Warnings must be given by the 
person most capable of making a decision regarding the risk to 
any given individual-the physician who will prescribe the 
drug.137 
Comment k imposes a modified strict liability standard 
which is more properly adapted to unavoidably unsafe products. 
Manufacturers of these products may incur strict liability for 
manufacturing defects or inadequate warnings. However, manu-
facturers may not incur strict liability solely because they fail 
the consumer-expectation test nor may they be subject to a de-
sign defect analysis; unavoidable hazards are not deemed 
defects. 
Comment k is largely premised upon public policy.13s The 
131. Id. 




136. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 697, 677 P.2d 1147, 1153, 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 870, 876 (1984). 
137. Id. 
138. See supra note 6. 
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authors of comment k were concerned with the population's 
health. They did not want drug research and manufacturing to 
be infringed upon due to fear of liability!39 Comment k was tai-
lored by experts to fit the body of pharmaceutical medicines as 
well as other unavoidably unsafe products. The system has worn 
well for over twenty years. Society's need for development of 
new drugs has, if anything, increased. There is no need to alter 
the design. 
D. PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the fact that the California appellate courts have 
traditionally applied comment k to determine liability for pre-
scription drugs, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court of 
California will abandon that standard in favor of a Barker anal-
ysis. The policy reasons which underlie comment k will weigh 
heavily in the decision-making process. As has been shown, 
there is considerable data to support the fear that drug research 
and manufacturing will be severely handicapped with a broader 
application of liability. Additionally, the often expressed desire 
of the authors of comment k that manufacturers not become in-
surers of their products1'o is a persuasive reason to continue 
comment k protection for prescription drugs. 
According to the Finn decision, the court is unwilling to re-
ject the reasonableness language of the Restatement as a stan-
dard for determining strict liability for failure to warn in drug 
injury cases.141 The Finn court also asserted that this was not 
the appropriate case to consider the broader issue of "applica-
tion of strict liability principles to injurious side effects allegedly 
produced by prescription drugs."H2 Therefore, in light of the 
Finn decision, it is unlikely that the court will reject comment k 
in favor of a Barker analysis. 
It is more likely that the court will grant some protection to 
certain drugs such as vaccines which either prevent a disease or 
reduce the spread of a disease among a significant number of 
139. [d. 
140. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. 
141. Finn. 35 Cal. 3d 691. 677 P.2d 1147. 200 Cal. Rptr. 870. 
142. [d. 
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individuals. These drugs will continue to receive comment k pro-
tection. In order for a drug manufacturer to be held strictly lia-
ble, a plaintiff must show either a manufacturing flaw or an in-
adequate warning. The remaining unavoidably unsafe products 
or prescription drugs will be subject to a standard of liability to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis; those drugs must be de-
termined to be unavoidably unsafe and beneficial enough to out-
weigh the risks involved with their use. 
Concededly, this method of determining liability is not 
without fault. Initially, there is the question of who shall make 
the determination, judge or jury? Either alternative presents 
further litigation problems to an already overloaded judicial sys-
tem. However, the problem can be avoided if the California Su-
preme Court will acknowledge that which has long been estab-
lished in the appellate courts-comment k should govern 
liability for prescription drugs. 
A compelling proposal is for the government to indemnify 
those individuals who are injured as a result of vaccination pro-
grams. Not only are these programs beneficial, they are often 
mandatory. This, however, is a legislative matter, not a judicial 
matter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The unavoidably unsafe product doctrine of comment k was 
intended to apply to all strict products liability cases involving 
pharmaceutical medicines. It has served, thus far, as the basis 
for establishing liability in the California courts and should con-
tinue to do so. Additionally, imposition of strict products liabil-
ity is likely to result in a shortage or elimination of needed 
drugs. 
Furthermore, certain aspects of the strict products liability 
standard governing ordinary products are not applicable to 
pharmaceutical medicines. For instance, drugs are unique prod-
ucts. They are chemical compounds with characteristics inherent 
to their very nature. These characteristics occasionally cause 
problems. However, a change in the compound would alter the 
effectiveness of the drug. 
21
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Finally, comment k does not immunize manufacturers from 
strict products liability. Rather, it imposes a modified strict lia-
bility standard which is more properly adapted to unavoidably 
unsafe pharmaceutical drugs. The troublesome result of strict li-
ability would be a heavy price to pay for compensation of those 
unfortunately injured as a result of lifesaving drugs. 
Charlotte Smith Siggins* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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